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Is there a solution to the mind-body problem? 
 
By Damian E M Milton 
The mind-body problem can be said to be one of the oldest of philosophical issues and has 
remained as such.  The origins of modern philosophy are often traced to the meditations of 
Descartes (1596-1650 cited in Law 2003) who is associated with  ‘Cartesian Dualism ? ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ
that the mind and body were two separate substances.  Yet this led to the problem of 
explaining how mind and body interacted with each other.  Spinoza (1632-77 cited in 
Robinson and Groves 2007) in contrast to Descartes proposed a monist philosophy 
proposing only one substance, being  ‘'ŽĚ ? and that mind and body were identical as they 
were different properties of this one substance.  This essay looks at a number of arguments 
before concluding that a predicate or property dualist position seems the most plausible, yet 
the mind-body explanatory gap and thus the debate itself may be an intractable one. 
Monism suggests that there is no distinction between mind and body, thus relying on a 
notion of one mind (Idealism) or one body (Physicalism).  Idealism, associated with the work 
of Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753 cited in Robinson and Groves 2007) proposed that 
experiences were a giant illusion caused by God, and so everything is a product of the mind, 
which is a product of God.  This notion is thus unprovable, yet does not stand up well to 
KĐŬŚĂŵ ?Ɛ ZĂǌŽƌ ? ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ĐĂƵƐĞƐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ
than an ever-busy deity. 
Epiphenomenalism suggests that mental properties do not act upon physicality.  This 
explanation however, fails to give appropriate reasoning for the intentionality of actions or 
that consciousness can inhibit action. 
Strong evidence for the physicality of consciousness comes from those who have acquired 
brain damage and have lost certain cognitive abilities, or who are born with biological 
disability/diffability such as Autistic Spectrum Disorder.  These examples show a strong 
indication of an 'essential' difference of mind that comes directly from physical reality and 
that has not been trained into people by socialisation.  If mind and body are truly separate 
than why does not the mind rise above physical damage?  In the case of ASD why is there a 
difference of mind, if not biologically based?  Therefore, all subjective experience is 
dependent on that particular brain being operational.  Thus arguments for a substance 
dualism between mind and body are based upon weak foundations.  At first thought this 
may suggest that all properties of the mind can be reduced to empirically measurable 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?ǇĞƚƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇĨŽƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝǀĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ƚŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐ ‘ŵƵĐŚĞĂƐŝĞƌƐĂŝĚƚŚĂŶ
ĚŽŶĞ ? ? 
A classic problem for eliminative materialists is presented by Jackson (1990 cited in Law 
2003) of an individual who has never seen tŚĞ ĐŽůŽƵƌ ďůƵĞ ? ǇĞƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ  ‘Ăůů ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
about the colour blue, yet when seeing blue for the first time experiences something new.  
The sensory information was irreducible to physical descriptors and hence if not a different 
substance, a different kind of information or a different way of measuring information. 
The problem of the qualia of experience seems impossible for an eliminative materialist to 
explain away.  Seeing, hearing, cutting and smelling are all sensory physical information 
reducible to a physical thing outside of the body followed by a physical reaction within the 
body (separate physical events, yet one causing a reaction in the other), yet physical 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŽƌƐ ĐĂŶ ŶŽƚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƐĞĞ  ‘ďůƵĞ ? ŽƌƚŽ ĨĞĞů  ‘ƉĂŝŶ ? ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞway.  
More complex emotions may also one day be reduced to combinations of physical events, 
ǇĞƚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŽ ‘ĨĂůůŝŶůŽǀĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŐŝǀĞĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ
ƚŽ ‘ďĞŝŶůŽǀĞ ? ? John Locke (1632-1704 cited in Robinson and Groves 2007) would call these 
 ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ? 
If it were not for conceptual dissatisfactions with the theories proposed by Psychologists, 
one would perhaps be able to be more confident of an Eliminative Materialist conclusion 
that subjective experiences will one day be able to be reduced to objective descriptions.  It is 
ƚŚĞƵŶŝƋƵĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŶĚ ?, ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?EĂŐĞů 1981) that seems 
irreducible to physical descriptors.  It is the strange pƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŶĚ ? ?ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ
and perceptual awareness that continue to inspire endless debates between philosophers 
and social scientists alike.  Psychological theories such as Behaviourism attempt to reduce all 
mental experiences to observable and measurable behaviour patterns, yet have been greatly 
criticised for missing out that which can not be observed and hence the intentions which 
affect the behaviours in the first instance. 
 
I would argue that experience can be seen as a measuring/interpreting device for sensory 
information that stores and links data, thus perhaps the closest thing to records of 
experiences are memories and brain scans.  Thoughts are single physical events that can not 
be repeated in exactly the same conditions.  To objectify this 'physical thought' would be to 
create a new 'physical thought' out of an attempt at analysis or simulation, yet a 'physical 
thought' can be seen as an electrical/chemical reaction never to be repeated in the exact 
same conditions.  This physicalist position however would not want to say that subjective 
experiences can be reduced to objective empirically measurable descriptions, yet being a 
physicalist position would deny that there are separate kinds of entity in the mental and 
physical and hence would not agree with substance dualism, and thus would still leave open 
the possibility of a physically determined mental identity?  Of course this would mean that 
an artificial intelligence with similar physical states theoretically should be able to produce a 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ĞĨĨůƵǆ ? ?ǇĞƚƚŚŝƐŚĂƐǇĞƚƚŽďĞƉƌŽǀĞŶ ? 
The 'what-it-is-likeness' qualia of experience according to this argument would originate 
from the unique unrepeatable nature of physical thoughts.  Intentionality coming from 
genetic predisposition, an animalistic instinct to survive rather than die and the cultural 
conditioning of a culture (influencing the shaping of these unrepeatable physical 
phenomena), which is also unique to any individual and thus not repeatable in exactly the 
same way.  To me, people are biologically and culturally conditioned embodied individuals 
(although many would disagree), yet an empirical understanding of brain processing will 
unfortunately give us little understanding of what it is to 'live that thought' subjectively. 
The explanatory gap seems too large to be fully/perfectly bridged due to the uniqueness of a 
subjective thought ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝĂ ŽĨ  ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?.  
Therefore I would agree with a Predicate Dualism, similarly to that of Donald Davidson 
(2006) that the predicates used to describe mental phenomena cannot be reduced to 
physical predicates of language without something fundamental to the nature of experience 
being lost. 
In conclusion to answering this question, one could make a strong argument for some form 
ŽĨ ƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞ Žƌ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ĚƵĂůŝƐŵ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů  ‘ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĚ-body problem.  
Substance Dualism has lost much credibility, yet will undoubtedly be defended by theists to 
explain the existence of immortal souls.  Eliminative Materialists on the other hand will 
continue to try and reduce all experience to verifiable data and will continue to be criticised 
for missing a fundamental property from their conclusions.  It is due to the fact that neither 
the mind nor the body as concepts can neatly be reduced into the other and that the 
explanatory gap does not look any closer to being crossed that this debate may well remain 
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